

The *Indigenismo* of the Peruvian Aprista Party: A Reinterpretation

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FOR OVER FORTY YEARS, scholars studying Latin America and Peru have been bombarded with hundreds of books, pamphlets, broadsides, and articles supporting, condemning, or "explaining" the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (Apra). However, even a casual glance at the literature reveals that it is almost totally polarized between the fervent supporters of the party and its equally fervent detractors. Apra has been pictured by its admirers as a grass-roots lower- and middle-class reform movement designed to end foreign and oligarchical domination of the economy, to incorporate the Indian mass into national life, and to democratize the socio-political structure of the country. One United States scholar wrote: "The Apristas have demonstrated the vigor of their ideas. Their slogan in 1966, just as it has been for over four decades, is 'Apra Si, Comunismo No.' They continue, as always, teaching, organizing, and working for the Peru of their ideal—free, just, and happy."¹ Critics of Apra have long characterized the party as being composed of communistic terrorists who desire not the betterment of Peruvian society, but rather its total destruction. One historian recently wrote that Apra sought "to tear down the whole Peruvian social, economic, and political structure so as to replace it with one based exclusively on their own esoteric theories, rather than on a consensus of national opinion. They were in Peru fully as subversive an element as is the Communist Party today in the United States."²

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1. Harry Kantor, *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement* (2nd ed., Washington, D.C.: Savile Books, 1966), p. 143. For another laudatory and rather uncritical analysis of Aprismo, see: Robert J. Alexander, *Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962).

2. Fredrick B. Pike, "The Old and the New APRA in Peru: Myth and Reality," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XVIII (Autumn, 1964), 10.

The most unfortunate result of this intensely partisan debate has been the tendency of historians to view Peruvian history in polemical terms of good and evil, thereby failing to confront the political subtleties of an extremely complex society. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in the debate over the *indigenismo* of Apra and of its founder, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a debate which has produced an entire mythology asserting that Apra is the greatest defender of the Indian in Peruvian history. Although it is probably true, as one critical Peruvian journalist stated, that "in Peru all mass movements have been characterized by their love of the Indian,"³ Haya de la Torre and his followers have produced a body of *indigenista* literature which at least in volume surpasses that of any movement before or since. Despite this literature, however, Haya and Apra failed to mount an effective *indigenista* campaign. Their Indian programs were lacking both in design and in execution.

Born in the northern coastal city of Trujillo, Haya was supposedly influenced by the magnificent Chimu ruins of Chan-Chan outside the city, which caused him to write that "... something unjust had happened in those arid lands, that some tremendous cruelty was responsible for those tombs, those dry wells, those desolate streets, those silent houses."⁴ His germinal *indigenismo* bloomed during 1917 when he studied in Cuzco. Later as president of the Peruvian Student Federation, he travelled extensively in the southern *sierra* and wrote his father: "The suffering of the Indian pains me deeply. You cannot imagine what slavery is."⁵

While president of the student federation, Haya played an active role in the 1923 student-worker protest against dedicating Peru to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and was subsequently deported by President Augusto B. Leguía. During the years abroad, he began to develop his *indigenista* campaign. In 1923, in Havana, he stated:

See also his *The Modern History of Peru* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), particularly chapters 8-10.

3. Federico More, *Una multitud contra un pueblo. Etiología diagnóstico terapéutica de un sicosis política* (Lima: Editorial "Llamarada," 1933), p. 23.

4. Alberto Baeza Flores, *Haya de la Torre y la revolución constructiva de las Américas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1962), p. 48. See also: Felipe Cossío del Pomar, *Haya de la Torre, el indoamericano* (Lima: Editorial Nuevo Día, 1946), pp. 26-27. For Haya's personal recollection of Chan-Chan and its impact, see: Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *Espacio-tiempo-histórico. Cinco ensayos y tres diálogos* (Lima: Ediciones La Tribuna, 1948), pp. vii-x.

5. Quoted in Cossío del Pomar, *Haya de la Torre*, p. 77. See also Luis Alberto Sánchez, *Raúl Haya de la Torre o el político. Crónica de una vida sin tregua* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ercilla, 1934), pp. 56-58.

I can't recall the Indian of Peru without saying a word of protest and accusation. Those who have seen our Andean solitudes will have seen those great masses of sad, ragged, and melancholy *campesinos* who carry the burdens of four hundred years of slavery on their shoulders.⁶

In 1925, he wrote:

I am sure that in Peru no one will be able to achieve rehabilitation, renovation, or justice without fundamentally facing the economic problem of our Indian, the great base of our exploited class, who is the worker, the soldier, the producer, and the backbone of the nation. Because of that I consider the Indian problem of Peru basic and believe that our revolutionary action ought to orient itself toward it with seriousness and energy.⁷

Haya also invoked the philosophies of Manuel González Prada, the founder of modern Peruvian *indigenismo*, and José Carlos Mariátegui, the young neo-Marxist political thinker, to lend further support to his *indigenista* pronouncements. He continually praised the writings of González Prada, adopted many of the old master's ideas, and named his student-organized popular universities for González Prada.⁸ The thought of Mariátegui also influenced Haya and his followers, and although the two men broke over Haya's decision to convert his movement from an alliance into a political party, it is apparent that Haya borrowed many of Mariátegui's *indigenista* theories.⁹

6. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *Por la emancipación de América Latina. Artículos, mensajes, discursos* (1923-1927) (Buenos Aires: M. Gleizer, Editor, 1927), p. 43.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 124. For additional examples of his early *indigenismo*, see *ibid.*, pp. 89-105; Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *El anticolonialismo y el Apra* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Ercilla, 1936), pp. 177-181; Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *Construyendo el Aprismo. Artículos y cartas desde el exilio* (1924-1931) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1933), pp. 9-11, 69-70, 98, 104-116; and Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez, *La literatura política de González Prada, Mariátegui y Haya de la Torre* (México: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957), pp. 288-294. For an account of Haya's early *indigenista* teachings, see Josefa Yarlequé de Marquina, *El maestro ó democracia en miniatura* (Lima: Librería e Imprenta J. Alvarez A., 1963), pp. 59-60.

8. Chang-Rodríguez, *Prada, Mariátegui y Haya*, pp. 123-125 and 341. See also Luis Alberto Sánchez, *Don Manuel* (3rd ed., Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Ercilla, 1937), p. 203; Cossío del Pomar, *Haya de la Torre*, pp. 221-222; and Manuel A. Capuñay, *Leguía. Vida y obra del constructor del gran Perú* (Lima: Compañía de Impresiones y Publicidad, Enrique Bustamante y Ballivián Sucesor, 1952), p. 184.

9. For an account of their disagreement, see Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la república del Perú* (5th ed., aumentada y corregida, Lima: Talleres Gráficos

As elections approached in 1931, Haya returned from exile and announced his candidacy for the presidency. Early in the campaign, he made the Indian problem an integral part of his political pronouncements. He wrote in 1931 in a letter to the Aprista organization in Cuzco: "For Apra the *campesino* is fundamentally and overwhelmingly Indian. Paraphrasing Lenin we can say: it is necessary to begin with the Indian."¹⁰ In June 1931, he wrote: "The state ought to abolish *latifundismo* gradually, protecting and giving a technical impulse to the *comunidades*, educating the Indian and securing Peru's rich production for the benefit of all."¹¹

By the fall of 1931, however, he had softened his tone. In his speech in Lima's Acho bull ring on August 23, Haya barely mentioned the Indian problem. He called for the creation of an agricultural credit bank to aid the small landowner and to initiate land reform and new agricultural techniques, and, though he mentioned the Indian *comunidad* in this context, such a bank would undoubtedly have benefited the small, middle-class landowner rather than the Indian. Like countless politicians before him, Haya maintained that it was necessary to rescue millions of Indians from their state of ignorance and to educate them not only in liberal arts, but more importantly in trades and technical skills—a "practical education." Noting that the bulk of the army was composed of men from the middle and lower classes, he called upon the armed forces to aid in the education process and to join with engineers in constructing new roads and railroads to modernize the entire country.¹²

In the Plan of Immediate Action which was published in 1931 as the official party platform and which still serves as the basic statement of Aprista principals, Haya devoted a short section to the Indian.¹³ The principal proposals were: incorporate the Indian into

P. L. Villanueva, S. A., 1964), IX, 4209-4212; and Virgilio L. Roel Pineda, *El sendero de un pueblo* (Lima: Editorial "Garcilaso," 1955), pp. 120-121.

10. Partido Aprista Peruano, *El proceso Haya de la Torre* (Guayaquil: n.p., 1933), p. 13.

11. Anon., *Aprismo* (Lima: n.p., n.d.), p. 74.

12. For the complete text of this speech, see Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *El Plan de Acción*, Vol. IV of *Pensamiento político de Haya de la Torre* (Lima: Ediciones Pueblo, 1961), 19-67. French sociologist François Bourricaud acknowledges the paucity of *indigenismo* in the Acho speech, but asserts that the "Indian theme" was prevalent in subsequent Aprista literature. *Ideología y desarrollo. El caso del Partido Aprista Peruano* (México: El Colegio de México, 1966), pp. 16-17.

13. The Plan was re-issued in 1963 as the party's program for the presidential elections of that year. A handbook containing all the party platforms is: S. Martínez G., *Para la consulta popular: elecciones de 1963* (Lima: Ediciones Martínez, n.d.), p. 33.

the national life; pass legislation to conserve and to modernize the *comunidad*; promote small Indian industries and crafts; establish guidelines for revising work contracts between Indians and landowners; develop a general plan of education, taking into account the peculiarities of each region; establish rural Indian schools and use Indian languages in conjunction with Spanish; introduce agrarian cooperatives to help Indian farmers; and mount an energetic campaign against Indian consumption of alcohol and coca. Those sections of the Plan dealing with agriculture contained a program of land redistribution geared to create a class of Indian yeoman farmers.¹⁴ One Aprista writer concluded: "Haya, and through Haya Aprismo, treats the Indian problem in new terms. He ceases to consider it in abstract terms, as an ethnic and moral problem, thereby recognizing it concretely as a social, economic, and political problem. From this time on, one sees it illuminated and delineated for the first time."¹⁵

That the Plan deserves such praise is doubtful. Not only is it vague to the point of being useless, but it demonstrates a startling lack of originality. As early as 1821, Simón Bolívar demanded Indian integration and sought to redistribute land and to convert the Indian peasant into a yeoman farmer. In 1840, Ramón Castilla, then Finance Minister, attempted to improve and to expand Indian education and educational facilities. Peru's first civilian president, Manuel Pardo (1872-1876), also concentrated on Indian education as the most feasible method of assimilating the Indian into Peruvian society. He envisioned a national system of Indian trade schools to train stonemasons, silversmiths, carpenters and ironworkers. At the turn of the century, intellectuals such as Carlos Lissón, Mariano H. Cornejo, Joaquín Capelo, and Manuel Vicente Villarán all argued forcefully for Indian education and integration. All twentieth-century presidents, beginning with Eduardo López de Romaña (1899-1903), have held that the army should serve as a vehicle for Indian education and assimilation. Proposals for the creation of special Indian trade and agricultural schools appeared in Congress as early as 1907 and President José Pardo, during his second term in office (1915-1919), called for the naming of special travelling judges to deal with land disputes that concerned Indian *comunidades* and haciendas. During the *oncenio* (1919-1930) President Augusto B. Leguía called at least once for the implementation of every Aprista proposal, and did

14. For the complete text of the Plan, see Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *Política aprista* (2nd ed., Lima: Editorial-Imprenta Amauta, S.A., 1967), pp. 9-30. The Indian section is on pp. 23-24.

15. Cossío del Pomar, *Haya de la Torre*, p. 231.

so in far greater detail.¹⁶ Although these measures were never enforced, and they were all sorely needed to advance the Indian cause, Haya and his party merely followed the Peruvian political tradition of nominal support for Indian integration. He voiced familiar campaign slogans but failed to formulate the details necessary for effective implementation.

Moreover, Haya could not even claim a monopoly on *indigenismo* in the 1931 presidential campaign. Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, Haya's principal opponent, incorporated the Indian issue into his official Program of Government, echoing many Aprista points. He stated:

We cannot resolve this basic national problem if the spiritual attitude of the whites and mestizos toward our Indian brothers does not change. As long as we do not consider ourselves all Peruvians with the same rights and duties, the true unity of the fatherland, which is its base for greatness, will not be realized. Peruvians, principally the leaders, must abandon that protective and superior attitude they adopt regarding the glorious race that created an admirable civilization.¹⁷

In regard to Indian agriculture he called for the organization and registration of Indian *comunidad* lands, the restoration of lands usurped in the past and the distribution of plots to landless Indians. He wanted to promote agricultural cooperatives by stimulating the *comunidades* to join with small property owners to pool technical knowledge and resources. He also called for the protection of small Indian industries in order to advance the economies of the Indian and the nation. Particular attention was to be devoted to Indian education by creating special industrial and agricultural schools as well as rural schools and mobile educational missions to reach the most isolated Indians. In order to accomplish these goals, Sánchez Cerro asserted that the government should abolish all ineffective institutions such as the *Patronato de la Raza Indígena*¹⁸ and establish instead

16. For a detailed study of *indigenista* legislation, see: Thomas M. Davies, Jr., "Indian Integration in Peru: A Half Century of Experience, 1900-1948" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1969). See particularly chapters 1-3.

17. Anon., *Programa del gobierno del Comandante Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, candidato a la presidencia de la república del Perú* (Lima: n.p., 1931), p. 35.

18. The *Patronato* was an example of Leguía's flair for the spectacular in Indian affairs. Created by Supreme Decree in May 1922, it was supposed to provide protection for the Indian and to better his social, political, and economic status. It failed to achieve these lofty goals and in fact became an institution of oppression. For more extensive treatment of the *Patronato*, see Davies, "Indian Integration in Peru," pp. 88-92.

Indian bureaus in the Ministries of Education and Development, as well as a new Ministry of Labor and Indian Affairs. These actions were to be accomplished by administrative decentralization, improvement of Indian economic conditions, development of new lines of communication and transportation, and prevention of private or public exploitation of the Indian.¹⁹

An analysis of the political support the Apristas sought and received provides increased perspective on Aprista *indigenismo*. That Haya drew forty-four per cent of his total vote in 1931 from the northern departments, thirty per cent from Lima-Callao, and only twenty-six per cent from the remainder of the country, can be attributed to the party's worker-middle-class orientation.²⁰ The Plan of Immediate Action was certainly not directed to the illiterate and culturally isolated Indian of the *sierra*, who had neither political influence nor the right to vote.²¹ On the contrary, careful research of the document's salient economic points proves that the focus was on the laboring class of urban centers and the large coastal haciendas, on white collar workers in rural and urban centers, on small landowners and on the middle class in general. There were provisions for regulating wages, substituting direct income and inheritance taxes for the indirect taxes that weighed most heavily on the middle and lower classes, restricting importation of luxury items and exportation of capital, imposing government restrictions on commerce and industry, outlawing monopolies and trusts, developing production and credit cooperatives and creating a national bank to serve particularly the

19. *Programa del gobierno de Sánchez Cerro*, pp. 35-36.

20. Election figures for 1931 as well as an analysis of Aprista strength in the north are found in Peter F. Klarén, "Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party: A Study of Social and Economic Change in the Department of La Libertad, 1870-1932" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1969). See particularly pp. 191-192 and 209-210. One ex-Aprista argued that Apra was never socialistic, but "was always an organization representative of the interests, dreams, and ambitions of the old middle class which was in danger of losing its bourgeois status." Hernando Aguirre Gamio, *Liquidación histórica del Apra y del colonialismo neoliberal* (Lima: Ediciones Debate, 1962), pp. 197-199.

21. A total of 392,363 men were registered to vote in 1931, with a racial breakdown as follows: Mestizos, 234,546; Indians, 97,940; Whites 56,135; and Negroes, 3,736. The great mass of Indians was illiterate and thus disqualified, as seen in the low number of registrations in the heavily Indian departments of the southern *sierra*. In Cuzco, there were 13,992 registered to vote, in Puno 10,341, and in Apurímac 6,588, the great majority of whom, in all three departments, were mestizo. Moreover, those Indians voting tended to support Sánchez Cerro, who won easily in the rural regions of the country. For these and other electoral figures plus an analysis, see Basadre, *Historia de la república*, XI, 201-203.

interests of the small producer. In the area of agriculture, there was particular attention paid to the needs of the small landowner, including basic reforms in the areas of land use and expropriation, irrigation projects, rural labor, and the equal distribution of irrigation waters.²²

The national Aprista program closely resembled the program for northern Peru published by the party some months earlier. In the northern departments of Lambayeque, La Libertad, and Cajamarca (the so-called *Sólido Norte*), the Apristas enjoyed and continue to enjoy their greatest popular support. The issues of the 1930s emanated from the fifty-year conflict between the large commercial sugar plantations on the one hand, and their workers and the middle class of the area on the other. The Apristas dealt extensively with the plight of the sugar worker, demanding the abolition of the piecework system, the prohibition of the contract-labor, debt-peonage system known as *enganche*, the implementation of a minimum wage, the creation of labor unions and collective bargaining, the abolition of salary disparities between foreign and national workers, and the establishment of health and education facilities for all employees.²³ To help solve the problems of small landowners the party called for extensive new irrigation projects, a total revision of water allotment laws, and the creation of small agricultural banks designed to meet the credit needs of the small landowner. For merchants the Apra advocated the nationalization of railroads, the elimination of special import privileges, and the abolition of company stores on the large haciendas.²⁴

The party secured important financial aid from key northern businessmen such as Rafael Larco Herrera (he reportedly contributed 50,000 *soles*) whose medium-sized sugar plantation, Chiclín, was in danger of being engulfed by the huge Gildemeister holdings at Casa Grande. Rafael's brother, Víctor Larco Herrera, had lost his hacienda "Roma" to the Gildemeisters in 1925.²⁵ Thus the Apristas enjoyed

22. Haya de la Torre, *Política aprista*, 14-18.

23. For a discussion of this program see Klarén, "Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party," pp. 179-181. The main thesis of Klarén's work is that there was an economic revolution in the Santa Catalina and Chicama valleys of La Libertad. The old families and the small landowners were displaced by foreign investors who established huge sugar plantations operating as veritable economic entities. Plantation stores competed with local merchants. This economic dislocation produced a political dislocation, with the Aprista party being the principal beneficiary.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-181.

25. For the allegation that Larco Herrera contributed 50,000 *soles* to the Aprista campaign, see Ambassador Fred Morris Dearing, May 16, 1931, to Secretary of State, United States Department of State, Serial Files on Peru, National Archives, 810.43 APRA/83, hereafter cited as D.S. followed by the identification number. Rafael Larco Herrera continued to support Aprista

some northern upper-class support which influenced the tenor of their party platform.

Another middle-and upper-class element in the Aprista ranks which mitigated against leftist extremism in general and radical *indigenismo* in particular were the followers of former President Augusto B. Leguía. Throughout his eleven-year rule, the *oncenio*, Leguía attacked and sought to render impotent the old Civilista oligarchy which had ruled Peru since the 1890s. He censored and closed its newspapers, expedited the disintegration and demise of its political parties, and deported its leaders. He also applied economic pressure to the Civilistas and sought to displace them with anti-Civilista upper and middle-class elements. The overthrow of Leguía in 1930 provided the Civilistas with a long-awaited opportunity to reestablish their former political and economic hegemony. Owing in part to internal bickering, the Civilistas failed to agree on a single presidential candidate and turned instead to the leader of the 1930 coup d'état, Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro.

Sánchez Cerro had been active in revolts and attempted revolts since 1914, when he had been wounded in the successful overthrow of President Guillermo Billinghurst (1912-1914). He had rebelled several times during the *oncenio*, and his success in 1930 was due more to the internal collapse of Leguía's administration and to the weariness of the Peruvian people with his policies than it was to the abilities of Sánchez Cerro. He came from a lower-class, mestizo family which normally would have made him unacceptable to the upper class, but his popularity with the lower class and his ability to speak its language, together with Civilista inability to unite behind a candidate of their own, won him the backing of such Civilista leaders as Antonio Miró Quesada, editor of the powerful Lima newspaper, *El Comercio*.²⁶

principles and in 1933, through his Lima newspaper *La Crónica*, he declared himself in accord with various Aprista proposals. See Dearing, November 16, 1933, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00/1046. For an excellent analysis of the economic change in La Libertad and its effect on the Larco Herrera family, see Klarén, "Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party," chapters 1-3.

26. Apristas have long asserted that Sánchez Cerro was merely a tool for the Civilistas. Although this claim may be an exaggeration, there is no doubt that he received their political and financial backing. United States Embassy officials in Peru reported as early as 1930 that "Colonel Sánchez Cerro is about to allow himself to be appropriated by the very reactionary old Civilista Party, representing the land owning aristocracy and vested interests, headed by Antonio Miró Quesada. . . ." Dearing, October 29, 1930, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00 Revolutions/75. Further examples of Civilista support for Sánchez Cerro and their attempts to regain power through him can be found in this same series of papers.

For an anti-Aprista claim that Civilistas were the architects of Sánchez

The Leguistas, who were also badly divided, bore the additional burden of blame for the political and economic excesses of the *oncenio*. Unable to run a candidate, much less win the election, many Leguistas drifted into Aprista ranks. Civilistas and Sánchez-Cerristas attempted to discredit the Apristas with charges that Aprismo was merely an extension of Leguismo.

Although the Apristas strenuously denied any connection with the deposed president, Haya certainly accepted and even courted Leguista backing. During his return voyage to Peru in 1931, Haya passed through New York and reportedly spent some time with Alfredo Larrañaga, Leguía's son-in-law, and also with other high Leguista officials.²⁷ Jorge Basadre, the leading Peruvian historian of his generation, noted soon after the election of 1931 that "some people allied personally or for family reasons with Leguía's regime are now Apristas,"²⁸ and Miss Anna Graves, a long-time friend and financial supporter of Haya, wrote that much of the Civilista ferocity directed against Haya in 1931 was due to "the fact that Haya spoke to and seemed to be willing to receive as helpers some of the old Leguía men."²⁹ One anti-Apra and anti-Sánchez Cerro journalist asserted that former Leguistas poured into the Aprista party, and that, in reality, the 1931 election was a battle between the pro- and anti-Leguía wings of the oligarchy rather than a contest between Sánchez Cerro and Haya.³⁰ This thesis is perhaps overdrawn, but former Leguistas did

Cerro's reign of terror, see Federico More, *Zoocracia y canibalismo* (Lima: Editorial "Llamarada," 1933), pp. 36-37. For a comparable position, see Jorge Basadre, "Letter From Peru: The Recent Election in Retrospect," a letter sent by Basadre to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and filed as D.S. 823.00/851.

27. Starrett, September 11, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00/743. Ambassador Dearing went so far as to state: "There seems to be no doubt that the old Leguistas are throwing their fortunes in with Haya de Latorre [*sic*]." Dearing, September 16, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/105. Indications that the Leguistas continued to support Aprista opposition to both Sánchez Cerro and Oscar R. Benavides can be found in Dearing, December 18, 1933, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/197.

28. Basadre, "Letter From Peru."

29. Memorandum by Miss Anna Graves to the United States Ambassador in Peru. Attached to Counselor of Embassy Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., May 28, 1935, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/205. Interestingly, Luis Eduardo Enriquez, the party's first Secretary-General in Peru, asserts that while in Europe in the late 1920s, Haya was secretly courting old Civilistas such as Francisco García Calderón, Mariano H. Cornejo, and Gonzalo Aramburu. *Haya de la Torre. La estafa política más grande de América* (Lima: Ediciones del Pacífico, 1951), pp. 73-74.

30. More, *Una multitud contra un pueblo*, pp. 22-26 and 129-132. See also *Zoocracia y canibalismo*.

provide the Apristas with political expertise, campaign funds, and a substantial number of votes.

The presence of a sizeable contingent of Leguístas served as another brake on the party's Indian platform. Neither Leguía nor his followers were ever committed to alleviating Indian oppression and in this their views coincided with those of the northern coastal and urban supporters of Apra. Thus there is little substantiation for Aprista claims that they were the true representatives of the Indian in 1931.

Following their defeat in the 1931 elections,³¹ the Apristas became embroiled in a bloody civil war with the Sánchez Cerro administration. Bitterness between the two ran deep, exacerbated by atrocities committed by both sides. The party was outlawed, its members persecuted, deported, and jailed, and its publications closed, forcing it to resort to the issuance of clandestine materials. During this "underground" period (1932-1945), the party renewed its verbal use of *indigenismo* and the volume of Aprista Indian propaganda increased.³² The programs proposed did not differ in substance from those offered in 1931, and were still extremely vague. For example, a communique released in 1933 by the *Sindicato Aprista de Abogados* called for the investigation of such themes as how to secure for the Indian the position he held during the Inca Empire, the social and legal posture of the nation toward the Indian *comunidad*, methods of providing financial aid to Indian *comunidades*, the conflict between *comunidades* and haciendas, how to convert *comunidades* into viable cooperatives, the relation of the *comunidad* to Peru's agricultural problems, and how to improve the Indians' technical abilities.³³ The Apristas also called for renewed efforts in Indian education and proposed a massive

31. Apristas and their supporters have always maintained they were the true victors, but despite the existence of fraud on both sides, the elections were relatively clean and Haya did lose. See Basadre, *Historia de la república*, XI, 201-203.

32. Although all Aprista publications of this period contained elements of *indigenismo*, the reader is directed particularly to the following works: Cossío del Pomar, *Haya de la Torre*; Carlos Manuel Cox (ed.), *Cartas de Haya de la Torre a los prisioneros apristas* (Lima: Editorial Nuevo Día, 1946); Haya de la Torre, *Espacio-tiempo-histórico*; Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *Y después de la guerra ¿qué?* (Lima: Editorial PTCM, 1946); Partido Aprista Peruano, *El Buró de Redactores de "Cuaderno Aprista," 40 preguntas y 40 respuestas sobre el Partido Aprista Peruano* (Incahuasi: Editorial Indoamericana, 1941); Partido Aprista Peruano, *El proceso Haya de la Torre*; Alfredo Saco, *Programa agrario del aprismo* (Lima: Ediciones Populares, 1946); Alfredo Saco, *Síntesis aprista* (Lima: n.p., 1934); and Sánchez, *Raúl Haya de la Torre*.

33. *La Crónica* (Lima), August 23, 1933, included in Dearing, August 28, 1933, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/191.

national celebration of the four-hundredth anniversary of the death of Atahualpa.³⁴

The brutal suppression of Apra by Sánchez Cerro and his successor, Oscar Benavides, had two results. First, it unified the party and intensified feelings of loyalty, and second, and perhaps more important, it enabled Haya to be all things to all men. Deprived of all elected or appointed offices³⁵ and forced into hiding, Haya and his lieutenants were never required to deliver on their promises. They maintained a radical posture in their official publications while assuring rightist supporters that they had no intention of ever actually implementing such proposals.³⁶ This opportunity for flexibility helps to explain the extremely low defection rate from Aprista ranks in the period 1933-1945.

The vacation from responsibility ended in 1945 when Apristas agreed to support the candidacy of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero for president, in exchange for legalization of their party. Bustamante won the June 1945 elections with ease; the Apristas picked up 18 seats in the Senate and 48 in the Chamber of Deputies, and sought to dominate the Congress.³⁷ Publicly espousing their Indian proposals of the 1930s and claiming they would now convert their ideas into legislation, the Apristas presented numerous Indian complaints and petitions on the floors of Congress in the three years, 1945-1948. Apristas also introduced several pieces of Indian legislation and claimed credit for the passage of several laws.³⁸ Despite the fact that the Apristas

34. *Ibid.*

35. In February 1932, the Sánchez Cerro Government ordered the arrest and deportation of all 23 Aprista delegates to the Constituent Congress. The best contemporary source is Luis Antonio Eguiguren, *En la selva política. Para la historia* (Lima: Sanmarti y Cía., S.A., 1933). See also Basadre, *Historia de la república*, XI, 213-239.

36. Such political maneuvering was not new. During and after the 1930 presidential campaign, Haya went to great lengths to convince United States businessmen and Embassy officials that he was really not anti-American or radical. One example was an interview which Haya had with Harold Kingsmill, the General Manager of the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, in which Haya promised Kingsmill that he would tone down his anti-foreign attacks. For an account of the interview as well as an indication that Haya kept his promise, see Dearing, July 17, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/89; and Dearing, September 16, 1931, to Secretary of State, 810.43 APRA/105.

37. Kantor, *Ideology and Program*, p. 16.

38. Aprista speeches and bills are too numerous to be cited fully. The complete texts are to be found in Peru. Congreso. Cámara de Senadores and Cámara de Diputados, *Diario de los Debates de las H. Cámaras de Senadores y Diputados. Congresos Ordinarios y Extraordinarios, 1945-1948* (Lima: 1945-1948). Hereafter all references to the *Diario* will be cited PDD followed by

asserted that they were adhering to a program of radical *indigenismo*, it was clear from the outset that they had in fact adopted a moderately conservative position on the issue.³⁹

One of the first Aprista bills called for the establishment of August 29 (the date of the execution of Atahualpa, the last of the Inca rulers) as the Day of Tahuantinsuyo in order to glorify the Indian and his history. Several senators and deputies opposed the measure, noting that June 24, which Leguía had earlier decreed to be the Day of the Indian, should be retained because it coincided with the Indian celebration of *Inti Raymi* (the Inca sun and harvest festival). Senator Luis Enrique Galván from Ayacucho argued that August 29 was a day of pain and national disgrace and that one should never celebrate the death of a great civilization. Nevertheless, the bill passed.⁴⁰

The law declared August 29 as the Day of Tahuantinsuyo, a national holiday. All schools were to provide special lessons that stressed the significance and grandeur of the Indian past and the promise of the Indian future.⁴¹ Although the law referred to Indians, this Aprista

the year, the house, the date, and the page number. See also Chang-Rodríguez, *Prada, Mariátegui y Haya*, p. 298; and Mario Peláez Bazán, *De la provincia al Aprismo* (Lima: Talleres Gráficos EETSA, 1961), p. 82.

39. For a dissident Aprista view which asserted that Apra betrayed both land reform and the Indian, see Magda Portal, *Quiénes traicionaron al pueblo?* (Lima: Empresa Editora "Salas e Hijos," Cuadernos de Divulgación Popular "Flora Tristan," 1950), pp. 8-9. For comparable positions by other former Apristas, see: Enríquez, *Haya de la Torre*; Alberto Hidalgo *Por qué renuncié al Apra* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta "Leomir," 1954); and Víctor Villanueva, *La tragedia de un pueblo y un partido (páginas para la historia del APRA)*, Prólogo de Luis Rose Ugarte (2nd ed., Lima: Talleres Gráficos "Victory," 1956). Villanueva recounts that on May 20, 1945, Haya delivered a speech in the Plaza de Armas in Lima and intentionally selected a balcony within earshot of the prestigious, oligarchical Club Nacional. He pardoned all past injustices of his opponents and stated that the party "does not desire to take riches from those that have them, but to create riches for those who do not." Villanueva notes that the speech was received coldly by party faithfuls, but "was very well received by the great landowners, the large industrialists, and the capitalists in general. The timorous were calmed. Those with their bags already packed suspended their travel plans. . . . They stayed. They waited. They did not wait in vain." *La tragedia de un pueblo*, pp. 28-29.

40. For the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, see PDD, Ordinario de 1945, Diputados, August 29, 1945, II, 632-645. For the entire Senate debate, see PDD, Ordinario de 1945, Senadores, November 24, 1945, V, 2708-2723. See particularly speeches by José Antonio Encinas from Puno (2711-2712), Luis E. Heysen from Lambayeque (2712-2713), Luis Enrique Galván from Ayacucho (2714-2715), and the shouting match between Heysen and Galván (2715-2719).

41. Perú. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas. Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas, *Legislación indigenista del Perú* (Lima: Talleres Gráficos de la Penitenciaría Central, 1948), p. 7. Hereafter cited as PMTAI, *Legislación*.

victory was a rather useless one for the modern Indian of Peru. What the Indian needed, as several legislators noted, was either new protective legislation or enforcement of previously enacted laws.

Since the 1920s, Haya and the Apristas had championed land reform as a solution to Peru's economic, agrarian, and Indian problems. It was only natural to expect, therefore, that upon achieving partial power in 1945 they would initiate agrarian reform legislation. They did not, however, introduce a comprehensive land reform law. Rather they treated each land dispute and each Indian *comunidad* as a separate, isolated case. Indeed, debate concerning the only hacienda expropriated for the benefit of its Indian tenants, Santa Ursula, owned by the Purísima Concepción Convent in Cajamarca, covered a two-year period before the Apristas lent their support to a revised version of the bill.⁴² There were many expropriation bills introduced in both houses, but the Apristas supported few and seem to have aided efforts to kill others.⁴³

The only truly important Indian legislation enacted by the Congress during the Bustamante period was the new *yanacona* law that was passed in February 1947. A form of sharecropping known as *yanaconaje* is still practiced in Peru today. The tenant or *yanacona* is given a piece of land by the owner, told what crops to plant, and supplied with the seeds, fertilizer, animals, and tools necessary for production. Traditionally, the *yanacona* has had to sell his produce to the landowner at a predetermined price, usually well below the current market price. His share of the crop was also predetermined, and was a fixed amount rather than a percentage. If the crop failed, the *yanacona* was still held responsible for the cost of the seed, fertilizer, and tools, as well as other expenses such as housing, food, and clothing. The *yanacona* was given irrigation water only at the sufferance of the owner and usually after the owner had utilized all he wanted. He was often forced to perform free labor on the hacienda. Contracts were rarely written, and the owner could terminate the contract at any time. The *yanacona*, rarely the gainer, continued to be the victim of severe exploitation.⁴⁴

42. PDD, 3rd Extraordinario de 1945, Senadores, April 10, 1946, II, 1094-1104; and PDD, 2nd Extraordinario de 1946, Diputados, February 28, 1947, IV, 206-212. See also PMTAI, *Legislación*, 196.

43. For a bitter attack against the stalling tactics of congressional committees and concerted efforts to kill Indian and land bills, see a speech by Deputy Sergio Caller Zavaleta from Cuzco, PDD, 2nd Extraordinario de 1945, Diputados, February 15, 1946, II, 751-754.

44. For descriptions of *yanaconaje*, see: Hildebrando Castro Pozo, *Del ayllu al cooperativismo socialista* (Lima: P. Barrantes Castro Editor, 1936), pp.

For decades the *indigenistas* in Peru had demanded reforms in the system, or its outright abolition. In 1945, following the election of Bustamante, the Aprista deputies requested Congress to consider the *yanacóna* law which had been passed by the Constituent Congress in 1933, but vetoed by President Benavides.⁴⁵ The Agricultural Committee, asserting that the 1933 law was outdated and deficient, proposed a twenty-four-article bill which in its final form included the following points: the size of the plot was not to exceed 15 hectares in irrigated regions nor 30 hectares in the *sierra*; all contracts were to be written and were to include name, age, address, fingerprints and civil state of both parties, a detailed description of the plot, a statement of whether the rent was to be paid in money or in kind, the exact portion of the crop that the *yanacóna* owed, and an agreement regarding the use of irrigation water; the *yanacóna* was not obligated to sell his crops or livestock to the landowner nor to perform free services, nor to work on other than his own land, nor to buy his food, clothing, or any other items from the hacienda store; the duration of the contract was to be fixed by both parties, but the minimum period was three years and the *yanacóna* could not be evicted before the end of six years; the rent could not exceed six per cent of the value of the land; the value of all seeds, tools, fertilizers, and machinery was to be figured in money with no more than twelve per cent interest to be charged; the landowner was required to provide living quarters for the *yanacóna* or was to pay for construction costs; in the event of crop failure, rent was to be decreased accordingly and suspended in the event of total disaster; and a special Bureau of Inspection of *Yanacónaje* was to be created in the Ministry of Justice and Labor.⁴⁶

Promulgated on March 15, 1947,⁴⁷ the new law proved difficult to

215-217; and Thomas R. Ford, *Man and Land in Peru* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), pp. 86-87.

45. PDD, Ordinario de 1945, Diputados, August 9, 1945, I, 175-176.

46. The debate over this law was extensive. The majority of the speeches are in PDD, Ordinario de 1945, Diputados, August 9, 1945, I, 175-176; PDD, 1st Extraordinario de 1945, Diputados, December 31, 1945, II, 523-529; and January 8, 1946, II, 693-701; PDD, 2nd Extraordinario de 1945, Diputados, January 22, 1946, I, 45-47; January 23, 1946, I, 126-131; January 24, 1946, I, 101-113; and January 25, 1946, I, 126-131; January 28, 1946, I, 133-166; and January 29, 1946, I, 200-256. For Senate debates, see: PDD, Ordinario de 1946, Senadores, IV, 2298-2324, 2406-2420, 2456-2472, 2508-2514, 2912-2927, 2940-2976, and V, 3050-3067, 3083-3106, 3214-3232, 3256-3279.

47. For the text, see PMTAI, *Legislación*, pp. 144-151. For text plus subsequent amendments and an explanation of each article, see: Leonor Breña Pacheco and Nelson Cáceres A., *Legislación de yanacónaje. Contiene todas las*

implement. Most *yanacona* contracts had been verbal, and rather than submit to the new regulations, many hacendados simply evicted their *yanaconas*. Others, who had utilized written contracts previously, substituted verbal ones to avoid the massive paper work required by the law. The section which based the rent on the assessed value of the land was impossible to enforce, with the result that the courts were flooded with suits from both landowners and *yanaconas*.⁴⁸ Governmental efforts to clarify the law and to establish procedures for its implementation failed,⁴⁹ and the law was never enforced. The hacendados had won again, but the Apristas took credit for passage of the bill, and even though they had defeated most attempts to simplify or improve it, they referred to it as an accomplishment in subsequent years.⁵⁰ Anti-Aprista Peruvians attacked the law and Apra's role in it, claiming that it had actually oppressed the *yanacona* further, and should be known as the Law of the Hacendado.⁵¹ The condition of the *yanacona* worsened,⁵² and the aura of Aprismo lost much of its glitter.

Apra's failure to espouse measures for Indian integration, redistribution of land, and general economic reform—all of which had long been part of its fundamental program—cost of the party in the 1940s and 1950s several of its outstanding leaders, among them Magda Portal, Luis Eduardo Enríquez, Alberto Hidalgo, and Víctor Villanueva. The political coalition with Manuel Prado, 1956-1962, produced additional defections and led to the formation by leftist elements of *Apra Rebelde* in 1960. When, in 1963, Haya formed an alliance (*La Coalición*) with his former rival, Manuel Odría, all but the most

leyes, reglamentos y ejecutorias supremas hasta la fecha (Lima: Editorial "Jolay," 1951), pp. 3-32.

48. See a speech by Deputy Albino Molina Sánchez from Ica in PDD, *Ordinario de 1947*, Diputados, August 14, 1947, I, 25-26. See also *Ibid.*, August 18, 1947, I, 55-57; September 16, 1947, I, 187-188; and Ford, *Man and Land*, pp. 84-88.

49. See Supreme Decrees of June 22, 1947, and July 10, 1948, and Supreme Resolution of April 7, 1948, in PMTAI, *Legislación*, pp. 151-156; and J. V. Fajardo, *Legislación indígena del Perú* (Lima: Editorial Mercurio, S. A., 1961), pp. 108-109.

50. See Paláez Bazán, *De la provincia al aprismo*, p. 82; and Saco, *Programa agrario*, pp. 24-25.

51. Alfredo Hernández Urbina, *Los partidos y la crisis del Apra* (Lima: Ediciones Raíz, 1956), pp. 74-75; and Portal, *Quiénes traicionaron al pueblo?*, p. 14. Aguirre Gamio held that the *yanacona* law "was an attempt to introduce certain reforms in the field without touching the wealth of the *gamonales* . . . Furthermore, the law confirmed the antiquated and reactionary system of exploiting land through semi-feudal methods." *Liquidación histórica*, pp. 200-201.

52. Ford, *Man and Land*, p. 84.

dedicated Apristas were convinced that the party had completely abandoned its reformist stance. Several Aprista writers and sympathizers attempted to explain this ideological transformation by asserting that it was not Haya who had changed but the world around him.⁵³ One scholar suggested that Aprista radicalism had appealed to the middle class during the economic depression of the 1930s, but not after World War II. Hence Apra had altered its ideology to retain middle-class support.⁵⁴ Neither of these theories, however, explains the inconsistencies in Apra's *indigenista* program during both the 1931 campaign and the 1945-1948 presidency of Bustamante y Rivero.

Haya's ideological shift, if indeed there was one, occurred long before 1945 or 1946. Haya derived much of his political backing in the early 1930s from middle- and upper-class elements who could hardly be expected to support his radical pronouncements of the 1920s. There are indications that Haya developed an ideology which appealed to the intellectuals, the leftists, and the lower class, and then repudiated it in private meetings with members of the upper class and business community.

For example, the United States Ambassador to Peru, Fred Morris Dearing, a career foreign service officer, wrote in September 1930 that Haya was returning to Peru "to exploit his communistic endeavors," and that "he is quite generally believed to be in the pay of the Soviets."⁵⁵ In January 1931, Dearing stated that Apra was

subversive in character and not entitled to the freedom of a normal and natural political party. Both Leguía's Government and the present Government have found them enemies of public order and purely destructive in their aim and in spite of their denials, it is almost certain that they are still under the influence of Moscow. A story has been circulated that the Chief, Haya de la Torre, went to Moscow last year, became disgusted with what he saw and thereafter resolved to divorce his following from the Russians. There is reason to believe that this is a blind.⁵⁶

53. An excellent example of this thesis is in Enrique Chirinos Soto, *Cuenta y balance de las elecciones de 1962* (Lima: Ediciones Perú, 1962), pp. 109-110. See also Pablo Silva Villacorta, *A dónde van las ideas de Haya de la Torre: una nueva visión sobre las ideas que conforman la doctrina del Apra* (Lima: Talleres de la Imprenta E.R.V., 1966).

54. For a detailed treatment of this view, see Pike, "The Old and the New APRA."

55. Dearing, September 23, 1930, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/50.

56. Dearing, January 19, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/59.

By April, however, Dearing, commenting on the growing strength of the Apristas and the possibility that they might win, reported: "Somehow or other the prospect [of an Apra victory] does not seem to me to be particularly terrifying."⁵⁷ The next month, the Ambassador forwarded a copy of a *West Coast Leader* interview with Manuel Seoane (referred to in an earlier despatch as "the reddest of the red and a very dangerous man"⁵⁸) and observed: "I have noticed from some time past that in practically all of his public statements, Mr. Seoane has shown that he is a sensible and realistic man."⁵⁹

Haya had sought out officials of important foreign companies in London and impressed upon them his desire to reform but not revolutionize Peruvian society. He also promised them that he would soften his anti-foreign stance.⁶⁰ Haya and other party leaders also met with United States officials to try to convince them that Haya had considerably modified his views, particularly with reference to Yankee imperialism and extensive nationalization of railroads and industry.⁶¹

Haya himself requested a private meeting with Dearing, to be held on neutral ground so as to avoid charges that he was insincere in his attacks on foreign imperialism. Dearing's report of that meeting is most revealing:

Señor Haya de la Torre immediately impressed me by something warm and sympathetic in his character and by his apparent sincerity. . . . He scouted the idea that he was destructive or ultra-radical and he seemed to have a sincere regard for our country which he has visited several times. . . . Señor Haya de la Torre indicated clearly that if his party should ever be successful, he would expect as much understanding and helpfulness as possible from our Government and a real co-operation between our two countries; he merely wishes it to be careful, considerate and fair. . . . At the moment the situation in the

57. Dearing, April 22, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/79.

58. Dearing, March 24, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/82.

59. Dearing, May 11, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/81.

60. Both Harold Kingsmill, General Manager of the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, and General Cooper, Director of the Peruvian Corporation, met with Haya in London and were favorably impressed with his attitude. See Dearing, July 17, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/89. Haya is said to have promised Kingsmill that he would reduce his anti-foreign attacks, and apparently kept that promise by delivering a very mild campaign speech in Cerro de Pasco in September, 1931. See Dearing, September 16, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/105.

61. For an account of one such meeting immediately after Haya's return to Peru in August, see Starrett, August 18, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00/734.

mining camps of the Northern Peru Mining and Smelting Company was active, and Señor Haya de la Torre told me, somewhat as an evidence of how he felt towards American interests, that he had that morning, through his various connections, counselled all of his people in and about the Trujillo district to prevent any violence of any kind and to throw their influence towards a peaceful settlement by a calm acceptance of the inevitable. . . . While talking to me, Haya de la Torre gave me the impression of relaxation, and while I was conscious of his intensity of purpose and have the evidence of the last few months to show that he is a man of ability and has the respect and adherence of many of his fellow-citizens, I am still uncertain as to whether I should say that he is a man of destiny or not. From what I know up to this point, however, I should think that if he should become president of Peru, we should have nothing to fear and on the contrary might expect an excellent and beneficent administration of strongly liberal tendencies in which justice in the main would be done, and a period of confidence and well being be initiated.⁶²

That interview occurred on September 1, 1931, and was not an isolated incident. Haya met with Embassy officials on several occasions and continued also to meet with leading members of important foreign business concerns.⁶³ After reading accounts of these interviews one might inquire: where is the feared subversive who would drive out the Yankee imperialists, who would destroy the existing social and political structure of Peru, who has been said to have sought not Indian integration, "but the total obliteration of one set of values, the European, and the unilateral elevation of another, the Indian?"⁶⁴

It is time for a fresh analysis of Apra, not only of its *indigenismo*, but also of its economic, social, and political philosophy. Such an analysis might well reveal that Apra, in the words of Ambassador

62. Dearing, September 7, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/102.

63. For examples of subsequent interviews with Haya, see Starrett, September 11, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00/743; and Dearing, February 21, 1932, to Secretary of State, D.S. 823.00/843. For the view of one United States businessman, see: Norbert A. Bogdan, March 19, 1935, to Edwin C. Wilson, Chief, Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State, D.S. 835.00/695. Bogdan wrote: "I met De Latorre (sic), the real leader of the whole movement and found him to be a very moderate and reasonable fellow, educated at Oxford, and wide awake to everything that goes on in the world today. I don't think that there is much danger that the mob may run away from their present leaders. . . ."

64. Pike, "The Old and the New APRA," p. 11.

Dearing, "is not quite the bugbear it has frequently been said to be,"⁶⁵ nor is it worthy of the dictum "Only Aprismo Will Save Peru." The role of Apra in Peru, indeed in all Latin America, deserves reconsideration.

65. Dearing, May 11, 1931, to Secretary of State, D.S. 810.43 APRA/81.